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Abstract. This paper introduces an assurance framework for networked 
medical device development. This work is being conducted to address the ever-
increasing concerns of medical device security with a specific focus on medical 
devices to be incorporated into IT networks. The framework utilises a Process 
Assessment Model and a Process Reference Model to address system 
development lifecycle processes, security assurance processes and a focused 
risk management process. There is currently no governance for the development 
of secure medical devices in place and so, this work sets out to resolve this 
problem by increasing the awareness of medical device security risks, threats 
and vulnerabilities among Medical Device Manufacturers, IT vendors and 
Healthcare Delivery Organisations. 
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1 Introduction 
Security of medical devices is a very serious and concerning topic among the medical 
device domain at present so much so that it has been elevated with the involvement of 
US Government bodies. One reason for this concern is due to advancements in the 
design of medical devices in recent years. The introduction of software and then the 
introduction of interoperable and networked medical devices have presented 
significant benefits for Healthcare Delivery Organisations (HDOs) and for patient 
care. The design and functionality of these devices have changed tremendously in the 
last number of years. However, the development processes have remained unchanged 
and consideration for new types of risks for such devices with communication 
capabilities has not yet been adequately built into the development life cycle. This 
work sets out to change this and to overcome gaps in the development life cycle 
where security requirements need to be prioritised. This work introduces a Process 
Assessment Model (PAM) that incorporates the system development life cycle 
processes and builds upon this to add further assurance for these processes. It then 
incorporates a very focused security risk management process with a specific set of 
security controls, requirements and capabilities for consideration. 
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ISO/IEC 15504-2 [1] is an international standard that is often used in the IT and 
software industry to establish an organisations ability to achieve a particular process 
or set of processes. It provides a measurement framework for process capabilities and 
defines the requirements for performing the assessment. In utilising ISO/IEC 15504 
the three major outputs are the Process Reference Model (PRMs), PAM and a 
capability measurement of the assessed processes.  Existing generic Software Process 
Improvement (SPI) models are available which include the Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI®) [2] and ISO 15504-6:2006 [3] (SPICE) however these 
models were not developed to provide sufficient coverage of all areas necessary to 
assure the security of medical devices being incorporated into an IT network [4]. We 
achieve this through the development and implementation of an enhanced Process 
Reference Model (PRM), a Process Assessment Model (PAM) (including a Process 
Measurement Framework in compliance with IEC/ISO 15504-2 [1]) for the assurance 
of Medical Device Manufacturers (MDMs) development processes. It is intended that 
this will impact MDMs in their design decisions during the development of 
networked medical devices. In developing this framework, another key objective is to 
strengthen the relationship between MDMs and HDOs with involvement of HDO IT 
administration staff during the planning stage. This communication will assist MDMs 
better understand the environment, the intended use and the users of the medical 
device and, through a predefined set of security capabilities, the HDO will be able to 
better communicate the security requirements for a particular medical device.  
This research aims to address security in networked medical devices and to build 
an awareness of the types of security vulnerabilities and threats that can negatively 
impact the safety of patients through the development of a focused security risk 
management process. Section 1.1 discusses the background to this problem, the 
reason for this work, and the approach taken. Section two describes process assurance 
and discusses key standards. Section three concludes the paper and details the 
expected impact this research will have upon the medical device industry (including 
the HDOs, MDMs) and in terms of regulatory compliance assessments. 
1.1 Background 
Medical device design innovations over the last number of years have provided 
significant benefits for patient care and healthcare providers. An increased use of 
software has allowed MDMs to add sophisticated functionality to devices. More 
recently medical devices include functionality to communicate via healthcare IT 
networks, wirelessly, across the Internet and from device to device. Networked 
medical devices can now provide patients with around-the-clock care outside the 
healthcare environment. Resource demand for HDOs to administer this care is also 
significantly reduced. HDOs utilize a wide range of networked devices from hard-
wired monitoring devices such as diagnostic equipment (CT scanners) to implanted 
medical devices such as defibrillators. Clearly the benefits of networking these 
devices are significant but, in using such technology, a new set of risks arise 
associated with their use. These are security risks, threats and vulnerabilities.  In the 
last 12 months there have been many published reports highlighting the vulnerabilities 
of networked medical devices. One report issued by the Department of Homeland 
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Security [5] highlights common threats associated with each type of device 
(implantable, external and portable medical devices). As this technology is relatively 
new, there is fear within the healthcare industry that the security of medical devices is 
insufficient and has not been thoroughly addressed in terms of research and design. 
More concerning is that malicious attackers have not yet fully exploited these devices 
but they do possess the potential to do so. This became evident through a number of 
controlled hacking demonstrations where security researchers proved the vulnerability 
of medical devices. One such incident was at the 2011 Black Hat Security Conference 
in Las Vegas where, a diabetic security researcher, Jerome Radcliffe, hacked his own 
insulin pump. This enabled him to increase and decrease the dosage levels without a 
warning that either, the pump had been tampered with or that the dosage levels may 
be harmful to him. More recently, researchers from Cylance, a stealth security firm 
based in Irvine, California, hacked into Philips XPER medical management system 
and allowed them to take control of other pieces of connected equipment [6]. This 
raised a lot of concern within the medical device domain and led to the interjection of 
the US government, which prompted a US Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
inquiry into the FDA’s assessment of medical devices in terms of security. The 
outcome of this was a report published in August 2012 [7] detailing the lack of 
consideration for both intentional and non-intentional security vulnerabilities during 
the FDA’s PMA and 510k approval processes. This paper outlines work that 
addresses security issues for medical devices to be incorporated into an IT network. 
The remainder of section 1 presents an overview of this research and also the 
approach to address This round of checking takes place about two weeks after the 
files have been sent to the Editorial by the Contact Volume Editor, i.e. roughly seven 
weeks before the start of the conference for conference proceedings, or seven weeks 
before the volume leaves the printer’s, for post-proceedings. If SPS does not receive a 
reply from a particular contact author, within the timeframe given, then it is presumed 
that the author has found no errors in the paper. The tight publication schedule of 
LNCS does not allow SPS to send reminders or search for alternative email addresses 
on the Internet.  
1.2 Framework Development – The Approach 
The first step in this approach was to select a suitable PRM to build the PAM upon.  
A system life cycle process standard was most suitable as a foundation for the PAM 
as it addresses the life cycle of a system (including hardware and software), in 25 
processes, from concept through to retirement. In order to place emphasis on security, 
it was felt that further assurance of particular development processes was required so 
the PAM was tailored to include additional processes, activities and tasks from 
another standard. This standard specifically addresses assurance in the system life 
cycle based on a selected critical property of a system (i.e. dependability, safety, 
security etc.). 
As one of the main objectives of this work is to provide MDMs with a focused 
security risk management process we have facilitated this by furthering enhancing the 
PAM to include a list of security controls to be addressed during the development life 
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cycle of the system. In order to achieve this, a security standard review has been 
performed. A complete set of controls deemed relevant to these types of medical 
devices were devised and validated through the use of expert opinion, interested 
parties within the FDA and the International medical device standards committee (i.e. 
IEC SC62A JWG7). The outcome of this exercise is a technical report presenting 
these security controls. This will be raised as a new work item in May 2013 at the IEC 
SC62A JWG7 International standards meeting. In addition to this another technical 
report will be published to provide guidance to MDMs for the implementation of the 
PAM. Upon the preliminary completion of this framework, it will be trialed within 
MDMs and HDOs within both the EU and the US. 
Figure 1 details the overview of this framework for addressing security in the 
development life cycle stages for networked medical devices. 
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Fig. 1. Process Assurance Overview 
2 Security Process Assurance 
2.1 ISO/IEC 15504 – Process Assessment Model 
The International standard for Software Process Improvement and Capability 
determination (ISO/IEC 15504) will be utilized to establish the development process 
capability level.  Compliance with IEC/ISO 15504 results in the following outputs; a 
PRM and a PAM (including an aligned Measurement Framework). The PAM 
contains two dimensions, which are the Process Dimension and the Capability 
Dimension. The Process Dimension is developed from an external PRM that presents 
the processes for assessment in terms of their ‘Purpose’ and ‘Outcome’. The PRM 
helps support process analysis and design activities as it provides a set of descriptions 
of the processes to be assessed. The PAM expands the PRM with the use of a set of 
Performance Indicators called Base Practices and Work Products. The Performance 
Indicators vary from process to process. Work Products are both, inputs to a process 
and also the outputs produced by a process. The Work Product Performance 
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Indicators are the results of performing the process and are used to review the 
effectiveness of each process.  Base Practices are the actions taken to transform the 
inputs into outputs addressing the purpose of the process. They describe ‘what’ should 
be done in order to address the process but do not detail ‘how’ it should be done. The 
Base Practices are the basic required activities that specifically address the process 
purpose. Combined evidence of Work Practice characteristics and the performance of 
Base Practices provide the objective evidence of achievement of the ‘Process 
Purpose’. 
ISO/IEC 15504-2 [1] sets out a Capability dimension that utilizes six Capability 
Levels from Level 0, ‘Incomplete’ to Level 5, ‘Optimizing’. ISO/IEC 15504-2 defines 
the measurement framework based upon a set of 9 Process Attributes associated with 
Levels one through to five. These Process Attributes represent measurable 
characteristics required to manage and improve each process.  The extent of 
achievement of each attribute is defined on a rating scale. In ISO/IEC 15504-6, these 
Process Attributes include Generic Practices and Generic Work Products that belong 
to a set of Process Capability Indicators. These indicators provide the means of 
achievement of the capability addressed by each of the Process Attributes within each 
of the associated Capability Levels.  
For the solution, the most suitable PRM is defined in ISO/IEC 15288 – Systems 
Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes [8] and forms the foundation for the 
PAM.  ISO/IEC 15288 provides a process framework that covers the entire life cycle 
of systems from cradle to retirement. A system development life cycle standard is 
most applicable to networked medical devices as these devices may contain one or 
more of the following: “Software, hardware, humans, processes (e.g. review 
processes), procedures (e.g. operator instructions), facilities and natural occurring 
entities (e.g. water, organisms, minerals)”. 
Due to the fact that ISO/IEC 15504-6 [3] uses ISO/IEC 15288 as the external 
PRM, this was then selected as a suitable foundation for the PAM.  ISO/IEC 15504-6 
details an exemplar PAM that also includes the process attributes that are compliant 
with ISO/IEC 15504-2. The Process Dimension utilizes the processes as defined in 
ISO/IEC 15288 and divides these into four groups which are the Agreement, 
Enterprise, Project and Technical processes. While the foundation PRM and the PAM 
framework addresses the entire system life cycle it has been extended for the 
inclusion of additional processes from ISO/IEC 15026-4 [9]. These processes are 
included as a measure to address security assurance of networked medical devices. 
This is discussed in the following section.  
2.2 Building Additional Assurance into the PAM  
Due to advancements in medical device designs and the fact that it is now proven that 
networked and interoperable medical devices are open to malicious attack, additional 
steps are required during the development life cycle to address security. An emphasis 
on security is required and has been achieved through the inclusion of processes in the 
PRM from ISO/IEC 15026-4 – Systems and Software Engineering – Systems and 
Software assurance – Assurance in the Life Cycle. ISO/IEC 15026-4 is mainly 
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utilized where additional assurance for a critical property, such as dependability, 
safety or security, is required for a system or software. The standard is used as an add-
on to an already existing life cycle process standard (such as ISO/IEC 15288).   
Table 1.  IEC/TR 80001-2-2 Capabilities 
 Security Capability Code 
1 Automatic Logoff ALOF 
2 Audit Controls AUDT 
3 Authorization AUTH 
4 Configuration of Security Features CNFS 
5 Cyber Security Product Upgrades CSUP 
6 Data Backup and Disaster Recovery DTBK 
7 Emergency Access EMRG 
8 Health Data De-Identification DIDT 
9 Health Data Integrity and Authentication IGAU 
10 Health Data Storage Confidentiality STCF 
11 Malware Detection/Protection MLDP 
12 Node Authentication NAUT 
13 Person Authentication PAUT 
14 Physical Locks on Device PLOK 
15 Security Guides SGUD 
16 System and Application Hardening SAHD 
17 3rd Party Components in Product Lifecycle Roadmaps RDMP 
18 Transmission Confidentiality TXCF 
19 Transmission Integrity TXIG 
20 Unique User ID UUID 
 
ISO/IEC 15026-4 is an international standard recently published that provides a 
process framework (Systems Assurance Process View) for software or a system that 
requires assurance for a particular aspect. This is usually when additional or careful 
attention is required for a particular system; otherwise known as a critical property.  
Critical properties are usually associated with substantial risk concerning safety, 
dependability, and reliability or, as we have adapted, security.  The standard presents 
a set of add-on processes, activities and tasks with guidance and recommendations.  
These processes, activities and tasks are intended to build upon the Agreement, 
Project and Technical processes as set out in ISO/IEC 15288. Therefore, conformance 
to this standard is achieved through the demonstration of these additional processes as 
well as conformance with the Agreement, Project and Technical processes of 
ISO/IEC 15288. For this reason, demonstration of additional assurance specifically 
addressing security, through the use of this standard, is suited for integration with the 
Process Assessment Model as set out in ISO/IEC 15504-6. The expected outcomes 
incorporating processes from IEC/ISO 15026-4 are [9]: 
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1. A subset of requirements for the achievement of critical properties is defined. 
2. Assurance claims, their justification, and the body of information showing the 
achievement of the assurance claims for the critical properties are established as an 
element of the system. 
3. A strategy for achieving these assurance claims and showing their achievement is 
defined. 
4. The extent of achievement of the assurance claims is communicated to affected 
stakeholder. 
3 Security Process Assurance 
As we have developed this framework to specifically address security as the system 
critical property we have enhanced the PAM to focus on the Risk Management 
Processes where we introduce new considerations to be utilized during risk 
management activities (Process Reference PRJ.5 from ISO/IEC 15504-6).  This paper 
discusses the security risk management process only and so this is additional to the 
normal practices for project and product risk management. This subsection looks at 
security standards and the development of a set of security controls for assuring the 
security of medical devices that will be validated and approved by medical device 
security experts in the domain and the FDA.   
3.1 IEC/TR 80001-2-2 
IEC/TR 80001-2-2 - Application of risk management for IT-networks incorporating 
medical devices - Guidance for the communication of medical device security needs, 
risks and controls [10] is a technical report which sets out to promote the 
communication of security controls, needs and risks of medical devices to be 
incorporated into IT networks between MDMs, IT vendors and HDOs. In this 
technical report there are a total of 20 security capabilities (Table 1) presented. These 
security capabilities provide a base template for a HDO to communicate their security 
requirements for a given medical device based on their needs. Prior to the acquisition 
of a medical device, HDO IT administrators may use this technical report to assist 
MDMs in establishing the HDO requirements. The benefit in adapting this approach 
is that the HDOs then become more aware of their requirements in order to securely 
incorporate a medical device into their network. It assists MDMs to better understand 
the intended use and environment in which the medical device will be utilized. 
However, the security requirements as indicated by the HDO are for guidance 
purposes only. The MDM will continue to carry out the usual risk analysis steps and 
upon completion of this will communicate back and agree with the HDO the 
necessary security capabilities for the product. This technical report will form the 
foundation for the security risk management process. The 20 security capabilities 
defined in IEC/TR 80001-2-2 will be included in the risk management process. A set 
of sub requirements, called Security Capability Requirements (SCRs) for each 
security capability will be required. These sub requirements present alternatives for 
implementation of a particular security capability. The security capabilities and their 
SCRs are intended to act as a template for communicating high level security 
requirements between the HDOs and MDMs. SCRs for each of the 20 security 
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capabilities in IEC/TR 80001-2-2 have been developed and will be validated through 
untilising the opinion of expert users, security researchers and also interested personal 
within the FDA. An example of a set of sub requirements for security capability 
Automatic Logoff is show in Table 2. 
Table 2. Security Capability Requirements ALOF ALOF 
Implementation 
Identifier 
Capability 
ALOF.01 A screensaver starts automatically 5 minutes after last 
keystroke/mouse movement operation 
ALOF.02 The screensaver clears all displayed health data from the 
screen. 
ALOF.03 The screensaver does not log-off the user / does not 
terminate the session. 
ALOF.04 User has to log-in after occurrence of the screensaver 
ALOF.05 The user-session terminates automatically 60 minutes after 
last keystroke/mouse movement/touchscreen operation. 
 
ISO/IEC 15504-6, Process PRJ.5 - Risk Management Process, the process purpose 
is to identify and assess threats and monitor the risks throughout the life cycle. The 
PAM further builds on this with the inclusion of the Base Practice ‘PRJ.4.BP.2: 
Identify Risks’ as a performance indicator. The MDM will conduct the risk 
assessment, considering the type of networked medical device, the design, its 
operational environment, the user and the users’ needs (as communicated by the 
HDO). For each of these risks, the following Base Practices must be performed: 
• PRJ.4.BP.3 Determine the Risk Occurrence Probability 
• PRJ.4.BP.4 Evaluate the Risk Consequence 
• PRJ.4.BP.5 Prioritize Risks 
• PRJ.4.BP.6 Select Risk Treatment Strategies 
The Base Practice PRJ.4.BP.6, Select Risk Treatment Strategy will detail the 
implementation of the SCRs for each security capability (such as Automatic Log Off, 
Unique User ID etc.) as communicated and agreed between the HDO and the MDM. 
In addition, to the inclusion of the security capabilities presented in IEC/TR 80001-
2-2, work has been carried out to survey an array of security standards and best 
practices. The standards reviewed were ISO/IEC 27001 [11], ISO/IEC 27799 [12], 
ISO 15408 [13], IEC 62443-3-3 [14] and NIST SP 800-53 [15]. Each of these 
standards and guidance documents similarly highlight security classes and controls 
with many repeating controls existing between standards. A security control matrix 
has been developed to map the controls across each standard and to identify cross 
over controls. An exhaustive list of security controls from all security standards has 
been compiled for review in terms of their relevance to networked medical devices. 
With this complete list of security controls from the above standards, a mapping has 
been done to link the security capabilities from IEC/TR 80001-2-2 to their attributing 
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security control(s). This will assist with the development of guidance documents for 
suitable security controls for networked medical devices. In addition to this, a gap 
analysis is being conducted in order to identify further capabilities/controls that 
should be included in IEC/TR 80001-2-2. This will be achieved through the use of 
expert opinion (i.e. expert users from industry and the FDA). The validated security 
controls, plus the existing IEC/TR 80001-2-2 security capabilities, will form the 
foundation for the security risk management process. A Technical Report will be 
published in the coming months detailing this security matrix gap analysis with the 
anticipation that IEC/TR 80001-2-2 will be revised based on this.  
4 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper presents a framework for the assurance of networked medical devices in 
terms of security. The solution combines an array of international standards, guidance 
documents and processes to create a step-by-step process for MDMs.  MDMs will 
follow this during development to decrease the risk of potential security 
vulnerabilities associated with the use of networked medical devices. As a PAM 
forms the foundation of this framework, with an associated measurement framework, 
it provides great benefits to the FDA and for external assessors in establishing the 
efficiency, thoroughness and quality of processes used to develop networked medical 
devices. This also benefits HDO’s with supplier selection activities.  The approach 
discussed in this paper focuses on development process assurance with the aim of 
positively impacting the overall security capability of networked medical devices. The 
remainder of this section describes the expected outputs from both the process and 
product assurance components of the approach. The output for the process assurance 
component is: 
1. The development of a PAM based on the international standard ISO/IEC 15504-6 
model that has been specifically developed for the international system life cycle 
process standard, ISO/IEC 15288. This PAM will be extended to include additional 
processes based on security being the critical property in line with yet another 
international standard for security assurance in the life cycle, ISO/IEC 15026-4. 
2. A published technical report detailing the application and use of this extended 
PAM. 
3. A validated set of applicable and meaningful security controls to be adopted and 
included in the Risk Management process of the PAM. 
4. The publication of a technical report detailing the security controls required for 
consideration in using this approach. This is fully supported by the FDA and a 
Standard Committee Conveyor. It is expected that this be prioritised as a new work 
item within one of the Standard Committee Joint Working Groups. The expectation 
is the development of an international standard on the basis of this.   
This framework will be trialed with MDMs and HDOs in both Europe and the US. 
Medical device security assurance driven development is a new concept and so future 
work will be to further build upon this to develop product specific SCRs following the 
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trialing of this with MDMs. Currently there is no method to specifically address 
security assurance for the development processes for networked medical devices.  
This is the primary focus of this research and so it is expected that the output of this 
research will positively impact the medical device domain in both the EU and the US 
by building awareness of security vulnerabilities, threats and related risks between the 
HDO and the MDM [4].  
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